What's in a wedge? Misallocation and taxation in the oil industry by Stefanski, Radek & Toews, Gerhard
 School of Economics and Finance
Online Discussion Paper Series
issn 2055-303X
http://ideas.repec.org/s/san/wpecon.html
info: econ@st-andrews.ac.uk
What's in a wedge? Misallocation and
Taxation in the Oil Industry.
Radoslaw Stefanski and Gerhard Toews
School of Economics and Finance Discussion Paper No. 1804
1 Oct 2018
JEL Classification: O4, H2, D61, Q3, O10
Keywords: Misallocation, Productivity Differences, Taxation, Oil
                             1 / 17
 What’s in a wedge?
Misallocation and Taxation in
the Oil Industry.∗
Radoslaw (Radek) Stefanski† Gerhard Toews‡
October 2018
Abstract
Resource misallocation explains a large part of cross-country productivity
dierences. Measuring dierences in marginal revenue products of labor and
capital across countries and rms allows for a quantication of the extent of
this misallocation, but is typically uninformative of its source. We address this
problem by using novel, rm-level data from the oil industry. We conrm the
existence of sizeable gaps in marginal revenue products across countries and
rms relative to the US, but show that these disappear once we account for
revenue taxation. Dierences in tax policies are thus sucient to account for
cross-country gaps in marginal products.
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 1 Introduction
e misallocation of capital and labor across rms explains an important part of
cross-country productivity dierences (Restuccia and Rogerson, 2017). Hsieh and
Klenow (2009), for example, aribute 30-60% of dierences in productivity between
China and India relative to the US to a misallocation of factor inputs across rms.
e extent to which inputs are misallocated can be inferred by examining the
dierences in marginal revenue products of individual inputs across countries and
rms. e marginal revenue product (MRP) of an input is dened as the increase in
a rm’s total revenue aributable to employing an additional unit of that input. A
rm wishing to maximize prots will increase the use of an input until its MRP is just
equal to the cost of that input. Paraphrasing Hsieh and Klenow (2009), consider an
economy with two rms with identical technologies in which one rm with political
connections benets from subsidized credit while the other rm can only borrow
from nancial markets at a higher cost. If we assume that both rms equate their
MRPs of capital with their rm-specic interest rates, the MRP of capital of the rm
with access to subsidized credit will be lower. is is a classical example of capital
misallocation since the combined output of both rms would be higher if capital
were reallocated from the rm with a low MRP to the rm with a high MRP.
ere are potentially multiple explanation for the existence of dierences (or
‘wedges’) in MRPs across rms (Restuccia and Rogerson, 2017). ese may include
variations in trade or transportation costs, borrowing constraints, institutional
frameworks or dierences in geography and climate. A more direct factor inuencing
input costs is the variation in taxation. If, for example, a rm operates two otherwise
identical plants within dierent capital tax regimes, the MRP of capital will be higher
in the high-tax regime and lower in the low-tax regime.
is paper aims to shed light on the source of wedges in MRP by focusing on a
globally operating industry in which prot maximizing rms allocate inputs across
a large number of countries. To do so, we proceed in two steps. First, we construct a
simple heterogenous rms model in the spirit of Hsieh and Klenow (2009). Second,
we use a proprietary database of the oil and gas industry from the consultancy
Wood Mackenzie. is database contains information on revenues, capital costs,
labor costs and - crucially - tax expenditures for all major oil and gas rms at the
country-concession-rm level for more than 3 decades. Combining theory and data,
we calculate the MRPs of labor and capital at the country-concession-rm level before
and aer accounting for tax policies. We then compare the distribution of MRPs in
our benchmark country - the United States - to the corresponding distributions of
MRPs in the rest of the world.
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 We nd that the MRPs of labor and capital are both higher on average and more
dispersed in the rest of the world than in the US. However, once we account for our
measure of taxation, the dierences in MRP distributions in the US and the rest of the
world disappear completely. us, we nd that the variation in observable tax policies
is sucient to account for all the observed variation in MRP wedges. Extending our
analysis to the rm level, we show that our results are primarily driven by rms in
the private sector.
Our results do not pin down the direction of causality between taxes and implicit
wedges, and the paper remains agnostic in this respect. Our ndings however are
consistent with two interpretations. First, we can view taxes as causing the large
variation in MRP observed in the data. is would be in line with the work of, for
example, Presco (2004) who nds that dierences in the eective marginal tax rate
on labor income in Europe and the US were key drivers of dierences in labor supply
across the two regions. More recently, McGraan (2012) shows that changes in capital
taxation played an important role in driving the Great Depression in the US, whilst
Fajgelbaum et al. (2018) demonstrate that variation in state taxes generates spatial
misallocation in the US. In our context, this direction of causation would suggest that
harmonizing taxes across countries would entirely eliminate observed dierences
in MRPs across countries by reducing factor misallocation and hence contribute to
higher aggregate productivity within the oil sector.
Second, our result is also consistent with the notion that equilibrium tax rates may
themselves be endogenous and emerge as a consequence of careful negotiations
between governments and rms who take those distortions into account. Stroebel
and Van Benthem (2013) for instance show that the negotiated levels of taxation
between rms and countries depends on a country’s cost of expropriation and a rm’s
expertise in production. Jaakkola, Spiro and Benthem (2016) show that commitment
problems on the side of the government can give rise to cyclical taxation rates in
oil-rich countries, whilst Cust and Harding (2014) provide evidence that rm drilling
activity across countries depends not only on geology but also on institutional quality
which is reected in taxation. In line with this research, our results suggest that the
observed variation in direct revenue taxation appears sucient to explain dierences
in investment.
is paper is most closely related to the literature concerned with cross-country
productivity dierences, the measurement of such dierences and the eect the
elimination of such dierences might have on output. Using data for the US, Restuccia
and Rogerson (2008) show that policies which result in an increase in heterogeneity
of prices faced by dierent producers can lead to large decreases in output per capita.
Hsieh and Klenow (2009) use microdata on manufacturing rms to quantify the
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 potential extent of misallocation in China and India using the US as the reference
point. Using micro data for the agricultural sector Gollin, Lagakos and Waugh (2014)
provide evidence for large productivity gaps across countries. ese results are
in line with Restuccia, Yang and Zhu (2008) who demonstrate that barriers to the
movements of labor and intermediate goods across sectors can lead to large sectoral
productivity gaps. Using publicly available macroeconomic data Caselli and Feyrer
(2007) do not nd signicant dierences in marginal revenue product of capital across
countries arguing that the output gains form a reallocation of capital will be limited.
More recently, Monge-Naranjo, Sa´nchez and Santaeulalia-Llopis (2016) relax the
assumption made by Caselli and Feyrer (2007) by introducing a new methodology.
In contrast to the laer, they nd evidence for a signicant degree in misallocation
of physical capital and, consequently, estimate the gains from a capital reallocation
to be large across countries. is literature thus provides strong evidence suggesting
the existence of large wedges in MRPs across rms and countries while only lile has
been said about the source of such wedges. We use data from a globally operating
industry to contribute to this literature.
We proceed as follows. In section 2 we construct a simple model which allows us to
to extract concession-level wedges to MRP, before and aer accounting for taxes. In
section 3 we present our data. In section 4 we estimate the wedges and discuss the
results before we conclude.
2 Model
In this section we sketch a simple span-of-control model which we will use to
measure the extent of misallocation of inputs across concessions in the oil sector.
By specifying the production structure of rms we can infer variation in marginal
revenue productivities, which in turn allows us to measure the size of distortions
or wedges at each concession - both before and aer accounting for taxation.
Importantly, to extract these implicit wedges we do not need to specify a full model
- we only need to specify the rm side.1
Firms Suppose that there are F rms indexed by f = 1, . . . , F . Each rm f , owns
n f oil concessions that are indexed by i = 1, . . . ,n f . A concession is an agreement
with a government that grants a rm the right to extract oil and gas in a geographic
area as well as ownership over the extracted resources - in exchange for a variety of
1To determine the impact of wedges on output or welfare, we would also need to specify the
consumer side of the model.
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 tax payments.2 We assume that all concessions are operational and all xed startup
or exploration costs have already been paid. Furthermore, we exclude the possibility
of entry or exit of new rms into the market or the entry of existing rms into new
concessions. We do this to abstract from the investment process of exploring and
developing new concessions and instead we focus on ongoing production. us, like
Hsieh and Klenow (2009), we are interested in the intensive margin of production.
We assume that production takes place at the concession level, and a rm is a
grouping of at least one concession. Each concession i held by rm f is characterized
by the following production function:
(1) Y fi = B
f
i (K fi )γi (L fi )αi
Here Y fi is the output of oil produced by rm f at concession i whilst B
f
i is the
exogenous productivity that captures rm-, concession- and country-specic eects.
L
f
i and K
f
i are the labor and capital employed by rm f at concession i . We assume
that labor and capital elasticities - αi and γi respectively - are concession specic. In
the tradition of span-of-control models, we also assume that our production function
exhibits decreasing returns to scale with respect to labor and capital so that αi,γi ∈
(0, 1) and 0 < αi +γi < 1. Decreasing returns to scale here capture the existence xed
assets (such as oil reserves) or of managerial ability that is required to operate each
concession. e decreasing returns also mean that each concession makes a positive
prot which can be thought of as rents arising from the existence of oil reserves or
as compensation for a manager’s or rm’s know-how.
A rm’s objective is to maximize total prots from all its concessions. Firms sell
each unit of output for a price P and pay labor a wage ratew and capital a rental rate
r . Each concession may also face a number of distortions or wedges. Distortions can
be specic to each of the two factors of production, labor (τ fLi ) and capital (τ
f
Ki ), as
well as common to both labor and capital, modelled as a distortion to revenues (τ fV i ).
Each rm solves the following problem taking all prices as given:
(2) pi fi = max
L
f
i ,K
f
i
nf∑
i=1
P(1 − τ fV i)Y fi −w(1 + τ fLi)Li − r (1 + τ fKi)K fi .
e price of oil, the wage rates and the rental rates are assumed to be the same
2Later, in our data, the geographic coverage of each concession almost always coincides with
an entire country - with the exception of the United States and Canada - where concession data is
aggregated at the state level.
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 across concessions in the model. is assumption stems from the fact that oil is a
traded good whilst capital and labor inputs are very mobile within the oil industry.3
Importantly, this assumption is only made with respect to pre-wedge prices. Any
immobility of inputs or outputs will be be captured by the corresponding wedges.
Distortions From the rst order conditions of this prot maximization problem we
can determine the before-tax marginal revenue product of labor and capital:
(3) MRPLBTf ,i ≡ P
∂Y
f
i
∂L
f
i
=
(1 + τ fLi)
(1 − τ fV i)
w and MRPKBTf ,i ≡ P
∂Y
f
i
∂K
f
i
=
(1 + τ fKi)
(1 − τ fV i)
r .
In order to maximize prots, rms will set the marginal revenues obtained from
employing an additional unit of each factor (i.e. the le hand sides of the above
expressions) equal to the marginal cost of that factor at each concession (i.e. the
right hand side of the above expressions). Without distortions to labor, capital and/or
revenues, the marginal costs of labor and capital faced by each concession is the
same (w and r respectively). In this case, by equating marginal revenues of each
concession to a common marginal cost, rms will eectively be equating marginal
revenue products across concessions as well. is in turn implies that there will be no
way to reassign capital or labor across concessions so as to increase aggregate output
and hence there will be no misallocation of factors across concessions. On the other
hand, if there are distortions to labor, capital and/or revenues, marginal costs will
vary across concessions. Firms wishing to maximize prots will no longer equalize
marginal revenue products across concessions. is in turn implies that aggregate
output could be increased by moving factors from low MRP concessions to high MRP
concessions. Consequently, examining the extent of the dispersion of MRP of each
input will allows us to infer the extent of misallocation in the oil sector.
e goal of this paper is to quantify the extent to which direct revenue taxation can
account for this dispersion. To this end, we dene aer-tax marginal revenue product
of labor and capital:
(4) MRPLATf ,i ≡ P(1−τ fV i)
∂Y
f
i
∂L
f
i
= (1+τ fLi)w & MRPKATf ,i ≡ P(1−τ fV i)
∂Y
f
i
∂K
f
i
= (1+τ fKi)r
3With the exception of a small share of low-skilled workers, labor and capital are shipped around
the world. “Many work as so-called FIFOs, who ‘Fly In and Fly Out’ for their jobs, oen on 7-7-7
rosters of seven days on, seven nights on, before ying home for seven days o” (e Telegraph ,
2011). Capital is also mobile with rigs routinely dissembled and shipped around the world.
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 By comparing the dispersion of before- and aer-tax MRPs of each factor, we will be
able to determine the extent to which revenue taxation accounts for the dispersion of
before-tax MRPs and hence the misallocation of labor and capital across concessions.
To operationalize the above, we rearrange (3) and (4) and take logs to get:
(5) log
(
1 + τ fLi
1 − τ fV i
)
= log(α i) − log(λBTf ,i ) & log
(
1 + τ fKi
1 − τ fV i
)
= log(γ i) − log(κBTf ,i )
and
(6) log(1 + τ fLi) = log(α i) − log(λATf ,i ) & log(1 + τ fKi) = log(γ i) − log(κATf ,i ),
where, λBT
f ,i
≡ wL
f
i
PY
f
i
, κBT
f ,i
≡ rK
f
i
PY
f
i
, λAT
f ,i
≡ wL
f
i
P(1−τ fV i )Y
f
i
and κAT
f ,i
≡ rK
f
i
P(1−τ fV i )Y
f
i
are the before
and aer-tax labor and capital shares. Since wages and rental rates are common
across concessions, examining the variation in before- and aer-tax distortions will
be equivalent to examining the variation of MRPs. In the next section we discuss the
data that will allow us to extract the size of before- and aer-tax distortions to labor
and capital at the concession level using equations (5) and (6).
3 Data
Our data contains information on the 24 biggest private and public oil and gas rms.
e selection of rms is based on Ross (2012), who constructed the list based on the
stock value and the value of the resources owned by the rms.4 For each of these
rms we observe a number of nancial variables reecting their activities across
countries between 1980 and 2013. e data is collected by Wood Mackenzie - a
prominent consultancy in energy and mining industries - and is gathered in a variety
of ways. First, they conduct face-to-face interviews with representatives from energy
rms in the relevant countries and examine ocial nancial reports of these rms.
Second, they collect information provided by country-specic regulatory authorities
and, third, they use a variety of media sources.
4ree rms were not included due to data limitations: the national oil companies of Iraq and
Libya, and Surgutneegaz which is a Russian hybrid (partly private and partly public). Since all of
these companies are state owned and do not operate outside their own state we do not consider this
to be a signicant limitation for our purposes.
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 variable mean p50 sd max min
Total Revenue(mil. US$) 4768.11 760.80 19964.47 436419.10 1.80
Capital Cost (mil. US$) 508.02 91.20 1532.29 19756.90 0.10
Operational Cost (mil. US$) 586.43 108.00 2381.40 45709.20 0.10
Total Government Take (mil. US$) 2731.44 329.30 15143.22 364597.5 0.00
Total Government Take/Revenue 0.43 0.41 0.18 0.93 0.00
Table 1: Summary statistics
Concession e exploration of a new geographical area is always preceded by
the creation of an agreement between the rm and the country hosting the rm.
If the rm is granted 100% ownership of the product extracted, the agreement
is referred to as a concession.5 e negotiation and the allocation of concessions
greatly varies across countries and depends on the existing petroleum laws and
regulations (Venables, 2016). e total amount and the structure of payments received
by governments under a concession are typically referred to as a petroleum scal
regime. In some countries, a single scal regime applies to the entire country; in
others, a variety of rm-specic regimes exist. In many cases, the concessions
allocated to the same rm within the same country are also interlinked in a variety
of ways (see the Global Oil and Gas Tax Guide 2017 for examples). In short, the
exact nature of a concession greatly varies across political jurisdictions. Since we are
interested in capturing such dierences, in what follows, we operate with variables
on the country-rm level for all countries with the exception of the US, where we
operate on the state level for reasons which will become apparent, and we refer to
repeated country-rm observations as a concession. In the last row of Table 1 we
provide information on the realized concessions of all rms and time periods in our
sample.
Descriptives Total Revenue is calculated as the quantity produced in barrels of oil-
equivalent multiplied by the current price per barrel in US$ and is dened as PY fi for
rm f in concession i . Capital Costs are calculated as the amount spent on durable
goods (assets with lifetime > 1 year) in US$ and are dened as rK fi . Operational Costs
are calculated as the amount spent on labor and non-durable goods e.g. (mostly)
5We focus only on concessions because it allows us to calculate the revenues generated by rms
across countries. Agreements are referred to as service contracts if the rm is granted 0% ownership
and as production sharing agreements if the rm is granted between 0 and 100% ownership. Such
agreements imply that at least a share of the generated revenues by the rm is owned by the
government of the country in which the rm is operating.
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 salaries and wages but also materials, insurance and maintenance in US$ and are
dened as wtL fit . roughout the paper we will refer to this variable as labor costs.
Our main variable of interest is the Total Government Take (TGT) which is the
total amount of tax payments received by the government from rms in exchange
for exclusive rights to explore and extract oil and gas in a geographically dened
area. As discussed above, the TGT is determined by the petroleum scal regime and
encompasses a variety of ows, such as bonuses, rentals, royalties, corporate income
taxes, prot taxes and a number of special taxes. While the TGT is considered to be the
most common statistic for the evaluation of petroleum regimes it has disadvantages,
as any other measure (Johnston, 2007; Venables, 2016). In particular, the TGT does
not capture dierences in the timing of payments, it does not capture adequately the
risk associated with individual investments and it does not capture the ownership
structure and the existence of non-pecuniary benets (Johnston, 2007). However,
due to the static nature of our analysis and our focus on concessions rather than
more complex ownership structures involving non-pecuniary benets, our results
are robust to such criticism. Importantly, throughout our analysis we will treat TGT
as a revenue tax which is dened as τ fV iPY
f
i . Whilst this is a simplication, historically
governments have overwhelmingly chosen revenue taxes in order to overcome
asymmetric information problems associated with observing costs in exploration
and extraction (Mintz and Chen, 2012).6
Since we focus on the period of production rather than the initial investment, we
restrict our sample to observations in which production, capital and operational
expenditure are non-zero and we exclude observations in which the rm is running
losses. Due to our level of aggregation these are essentially only observations
in which the rm enters a new jurisdiction and needs to invest for a signicant
period of time before production starts. is leaves us with 3381 observations of
214 country-rm-concession combinations consisting of 24 rms, 41 countries and
on average 26 years. e US and Canada lead the list with the largest number of
concessions which is 46 and 22, respectively. e so-called 7 sisters have the largest
number of concessions ranging form 14-28.7
6More recently, countries have slowly started moving towards a scal regime relying on prot
based taxation (see Mintz and Chen (2012) for an excellent survey and discussion). Ideally, we thus
would dierentiate between revenue and other forms of taxation, however our data does allow for
that. As a robustness check we reproduce our main results excluding all countries with prot based
taxation as dened in the Global Oil and Gas Tax Guide 2017. Our results are not signicantly aected
and are available on request.
7Shell (28), ExxonMobile (26), Chevron (26), BP (23), ConocoPhilips (22), Total (19) and ENI (14).
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 4 Empirics
Estimation To extract wedges from equations (5) and (6) we need estimates of
λBT
f ,i
, κBT
f ,i
, λAT
f ,i
, κAT
f ,i
, log(α i) and log(γ i). Whilst we do observe the before and aer-tax
capital and labor shares directly using the data described in the previous section, we
do not observe the values of log(α i) and log(γ i). To overcome the laer we proceed
as follows. First, we assume the average log-labor and log-capital wedge in the US to
be zero following Hsieh and Klenow (2009).8 Since we report all our results relative
to the US, this assumption is eectively a normalization. Second, we assume that
due to its geographic size, the US exhibits large geological variation, which allows us
to consistently estimate the population means of log(α i) and log(γ i) and mimic the
respective population means in the rest of the world.9 is is supported by evidence
presented in Table 2 which compares the availability of hydrocarbons in the US to
the rest of the world (ROW). e rst two rows compare the average number of giant
oil discoveries and their cumulative size per square mile since 1900 in both regions,
whilst the last row compares the estimated oil reserves per square mile in 2005. In
column (3) we show that these dierences are not statistically signicant. us,
taking advantage of the state level US data we can estimate the mean log-elasticities,
E
(
log(α i)) = log(α)US and E (log(γ i)) = log(γ )US , which are −1.38 and −1.57,
respectively. Given these estimates we can take the expected value of equations (5)
and (6) and obtain a best-guess estimate for wedges at the concession-level:
(7) E
[
log
(
1 + τ fLi
1 − τ fV i
)]
= log(α)US−log(λBTf ,i )& E
[
log
(
1 + τ fKi
1 − τ fV i
)]
= log(γ )US−log(κBTf ,i ),
(8) E
[
log(1 + τ fLi)
]
= log(α)US−log(λATf ,i ) & E
[
log(1 + τ fKi)
]
= log(γ )US−log(κATf ,i ).
Baseline Results To analyze our results, we begin by comparing the averages of
our best-guess wedges in the ROW to our US benchmark (see Table 3).10 e average,
before-tax wedges in both regions are presented in the rst column of rows (1) and
(3). In the US, the average, before-tax wedges are 0.44 for both labor and capital.
8In other words we set, log(1 + τ fLi )U S ≈ τ
f
LiU S = 0 and log(1 + τ
f
Ki )U S ≈ τ
f
KiU S = 0.9Note that a sucient, albeit not necessary condition, would be to assume that due to the
geographical size of the US, representing a signicant share of the global landmass, the respective
distributions of hydrocarbons between the US and ROW do not dier signicantly.
10We obtain very similar results when examining medians instead of means.
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 Geology Measures US ROW Di. p-value
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of large discoveries per m2 since 1900 -11.44 -11.28 0.16 0.42
Total size of large discoveries per m2 since 1900 -4.34 -4.20 0.14 0.58
Estimated oil reserves per m2 in 2005 7.77 7.62 0.15 0.68
Data on large discoveries is from Horn (2011). Data on estimated reserves is from Nationmaster.
Column (3) shows the p-value of an equality test of the means in the respective groups.
Table 2: Logged averages in the US versus the rest of the world (ROW)
In the ROW, the average, before-tax wedges are 0.67 for labor and 0.77 for capital.
Columns (3) - (4) indicate that these dierences are not only economically (26% higher
for labor and 38% higher for capital in ROW) but also statistically signicant. ese
large dierences, however, vanish entirely once we account for variation in direct
revenue taxation across concessions. e rst column of row (2) and (4) shows the
average, aer-tax wedges in both regions. Since the US serves as our benchmark,
by construction, the average, aer-tax wedge for labor and capital in the US is zero.
Our main results, shown in column (3) and (4), indicate that the aer-tax wedges in
the ROW are economically similar and statistically not dierent from the aer-tax
wedges in the US.
Distributional Results Next, in Figure 1 we compare the distributions of our
best-guess capital and labor wedges in the ROW relative to the US, before and aer
accounting for taxation.11 Consistent with our previous results, the distribution of
wedges in ROW is shied to the right relative to our distribution of wedges in the
US. Not surprisingly, we overwhelmingly reject the null hypothesis of distributional
equality. However, once we account for revenue taxation, both distributions are
centred around 0 and we can no longer reject the null hypothesis of distributional
equality between the ROW and the US at the 5% level.
Firm-level Results Figure 2 depticts our results disaggregated by rms. e black
dots represent average before-tax wedges of each rm, whilst the blue dots represent
11We observe a positive variance in the distribution of aer-tax wedges in the US. is indicates
that aer-tax marginal revenue products in the US are not equalized across concessions. Hsieh and
Klenow (2009) nd similar results for US manufacturing rms and argue that this type of variation
is potentially indicative of measurement error or model misspecication. In our case this variance
within the US could also be driven by the variation in US geology. In either case, this highlights the
importance of comparing distortions to some baseline in order to account for common sources of
variation.
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 Labor US ROW Di. p-value
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(1) Mean - before Taxes 0.44 0.67 0.23 0.00
(2) Mean - aer Taxes 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.73
Capital US ROW Di p-value
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(3) Mean - before Taxes 0.44 0.77 0.33 0.00
(4) Mean - aer Taxes 0.00 0.08 0.08 0.26
Note: In column (4) the p-value of an equality test of the means in the respective groups is
presented. We account for the correlation of observations on the country level (41 clusters).
Table 3: Mean Wedges
average aer-tax wedges of each rm. We divide our analysis into private and public
rms. We nd that accounting for direct taxation almost completely eliminates the
observed wedges in case of private rms (columns (1) and (2)). For public companies,
on the other hand, whilst accounting for taxes signicantly reduces the size of
distortions, it does not - in general - lead to an elimination of all the wedges. is
either indicates remaining ineciencies in public sector rms or a distorted measure
of taxation. Most importantly, Figure 2 implies that our main results are driven by
the activity of private rms.
5 Conclusion
We use a new data set of the oil and gas sector to conrm the existence of sizeable
gaps in marginal revenue products across countries. We show that these disappear
once we account for direct revenue taxes - a result driven primarily by private rather
than public rms. We conclude that tax policies are a sucient statistic to explain
the variation in wedges extracted using the Hsieh and Klenow (2009) methodology.
If wedges are caused by dierences in taxation, harmonizing taxes across countries
would eliminate dierences in MRPs and productivity. However, equilibrium tax rates
may themselves be functions of wedges such as trade costs, geography and the quality
of institutions. In light of the above results, the obvious next step to understand the
misallocation of capital and labor across countries will be the exploration of how
taxes are agreed upon during negotiations between rms and countries.
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 (a) Labor Wedges - before taxes (b) Labor Wedges - aer taxes
(c) Capital Wedges - before taxes (d) Capital Wedges - aer taxes
Figure 1: Wedges in Labor and Capital
Note: P-value K-S test indicates the results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test comparing the distributions of best-guess wedges
in the US versus the rest of the world (ROW).
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 Figure 2: Wedges in Private (Column (1) and (2)) and Public Firms (Column (3) and (4))
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